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In this paper we discussed how the literature traces a growing involvement of the national 
parliaments in EU policy-making. Three phases can be distinguished: limited or no 
involvement was the trend nntil the 1980s; after the Single Act (SEA, 1987), national 
parliaments started to be interested in European affairs and to set up specialized committees; 
following the Maastricht Treaty (TUE, 1992), the involvement of national parliaments in EU 
affairs became a response to the question of"democratic deficit" in the EU (Norton, 1995). 
The growing number of policies dealt with at the EU level, the consequently increased 
influence ofEU law in nationallegislations, the new powers of the Union: all of these worked 
together to push national legislators to seek a scrutiny role in the drafting of EU legislation. 
According to Laprat (1995: I), once the TUE was formally approved, a more parliamentary 
climate prevailed. In more recent years, national parliaments have distinguished themselves 
for their increased role in the scrutiny of EU legislation (Raunio and Hix, 200I: !52); more 
specialized MPs sit in the committees on EU affairs; the amount of work for EU specialists 
has increased. Also, parliamentary scrutiny, initially only optional and ex post, is now 
increasingly ex ante and/or mandatory (Maurer and Wessels, 200I: 425-475). 
Also, though national parliaments are not mentioned in the first ten paraconstitutional articles 
of the TUE, they are now the object of various specific Declarations and Protocols: 
Declaration 13 and I 4, attached to the Maastricht Treaty, and most of the Protocol on the 
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Role of National Parliaments, attached to the Amsterdam Treaty (1996), focus on the role of 
national parliaments. According to the Protocol, for example, national governments agree to 
send to their parliaments all Commission documents and legislative proposals. 
The Treaty establishing a European Constitution, in a new Protocol, leaves it up to the 
Commission, when it sends its proposals to the national governments, whether to send them to 
the national parliaments, too. Should one third of the parliaments oppose this proposal, 
however, it will have to be re-examined. The new Treaty **** 
As we shall see, the Italian parliament fits into this general trend quite well. However- oddly 
in a perfectly bicameral system - there is a marked discrepancy between the two chambers, as 
well as a persistent gap between what is done on paper and what is done in practice. 
Basic features of the Italian political system 
The 1948 Constitution of the Italian Republic- written and approved in December 1947, after 
the fascist period- is a long (139 articles), rigid, programmatic text. It is the result of many 
compromises, all aimed at reuniting the country despite its many cleavages. Italian society 
was - and still is - a pluralist one, and the Constitution reflects that. Indeed, the Constitution 
was not the result of a comprehensive and harmonic agreement, but rather of a number of 
partial agreements among ideologically distant political forces (Di Palma, 1977). 
Nevertheless, in most areas and specifically as regards the form of government, the 
Constitution essentially represented an agreement between the Communist Party (PCI) and 
the Christian Democrats (DC) to impose their will on all the others. Leaders chose to opt for a 
parliamentary system rather than a presidential one for this reason. A strong executive was in 
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fact perceived by many constituent fathers as risky for the newborn democratic system. The 
Italian check and balance system, as it were, is granted by the primacy of the parliament vis-a-
vis the executive; the latter's work can be scrutinized and eventually vetoed at any time by the 
parliament (De Micheli and Verzichelli, 2004: 77). 
In particular, the political parties were to play the central role in the democratic game: in the 
minds of the founding fathers of the Italian Republic, the system would in fact work because 
of the strength and the authority injected from outside by the parties. This started during the 
end of the War. As the Allies began their invasion in July 1943, the German troops occupied 
the main strategic points of central and northern Italy, including Rome. To escape the Nazi 
penetration, the Badoglio government and royal family took refuge in Brindisi. In doing so, 
the government and the king left the nation in complete turmoil. In the absence of any 
legitimate authority to govern, the political parties made their re-entrance into the political 
arena. Together, they formed the National Liberation Committee (CLN). The CLN did not 
benefit institutionally from any governing prerogative, yet it filled. the power vacuum: it was 
the only visible and recognized authority, and it set about confronting the numerous problems 
the country faced. The parties nominated the political and administrative authorities of the 
municipalities, so that they could take care of public services. Thus, the CLN got into the 
habit of nominating its members to take charge of the public administration when nobody else 
was in a position to do so: the so-called "lottizzazione" began in that period (Amato, 1993). 
Today, not only are the parties involved in policy-making, but they also play the role of gate-
keepers from both a political and a socio-economical point of view (Morlino, 1991). They 
appoint the ministers, they decide upon undersecretaries, and they choose chairmen and 
members of the boards of any public company or important public body - including the top 
executives of public departments, as we shall also see in Chapter 5 (Amato, 1993). The 
centrality of the parties, together with the choice to adopt a pure proportional electoral law, 
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ended up opening the doors to what is known as partitocrazia: that is, the rule and the 
supremacy of the parties. It also encouraged a continuous negotiation between the ruling 
majority and the opposition rather than direct confrontation (De Micheli and Verzichelli, 
2004). 
The Italian parliament is thus "a highly polycentric institution not easily amenable to 
majoritarian decisions and to firm leadership by the Cabinet" (Cotta, 1990: 76). The 
legislature is based on equal bicameralism, the Senate (Upper House) and the Chamber of 
Deputies (Lower House) performing identical functions and sharing the legislative power (art. 
70 Italian Constitution). 
It has a committee-centered structure and is, in many ways, a "working parliament". In 
particular, vertical committees are empowered, under certain conditions, to adopt laws 
without a vote in the plenary. Parliamentary procedures also assign a marginal role to the 
government in parliamentary works. On the other hand, opportunities for individual deputies 
and minor groups to influence the agenda and/or the legislative process are maximized by a 
prevailing "consociational" inspiration. All this tends to shape a recognizable organizational 
and procedural model whereby the parliament acts as a legislator and neglects control and 
scrutiny functions (Cotta, 1996: 79-91). In the beginning, this was meant to reduce 
confrontation and involve opposition parties in the democratic system. Over the years, 
however, it has weakened the parliament's performance and reduced its effectiveness. 
The Italian party system between the First and Second Republic 
5 
The Italian party system has been, and to a certain extent still is, a peculiar case among 
Western democracies. Unfortunately, in many ways, Joseph Di Palma's (1977) and Joe 
LaPalombara's (1964) classic works on Italy remain valid even today. And when Leonardo 
Morlino (1998: 250) compares the Italian and the Spanish cases, for instance, he fmds that the 
democratic regime in Spain has succeeded in becoming comparatively more consolidated than 
in Italy. 
In the postcwar period, the Italian parties developed along the lines of at least two different 
models. The Christian Democrats (DC) emerged as a confessional or denominational party, 
very close to the catch-all party model. The communist PCI, in contrast, became the classic 
party of mass integration. The Socialists (PSI) attempted to imitate the PCI, albeit with 
limited success. A similar mass party model was adopted by the neofascist Movimento Sociale 
Jtaliano (MSI). On the contrary, the Liberals (PLI) and Republicans (PRJ) could be regarded 
as opinion parties and, at the same time, elite parties. Giuseppe Saragats' Social Democrats 
(PSDI) occupied an intermediate position between the mass party and the party of notables 
(Morlino, 1998, 18 I). 
The electoral system that was initially chosen for the new republic - and that lasted until the 
early I 990s - was a proportional system. This helped create a very fragmented, unstable party 
system, with at least eight national parties represented in parliament at any given time. The 
Republic had over 50 Cabinets between I 948 and the early I 990s.: they were all rather large 
and unstable, supported for most of the post-war period by four/five-party coalitions (the so-
called pentapartito ). Coalition governments normally included the DC, PLI, PRI, PSDI, and, 
since the early 1960s, PSI. As long as the possibility of a government including the PC! was 
perceived as risky, the DC played the role of the ruling party, granting stability to the system 
(Sartori, 1998, 61-62). Jean Paul Frognier (1991: 77-85; 92-93), for example, showed how 
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governmental instability was counterbalanced by the existence of a pivotal group of 16 
ministers who were present in most governments. Yet, while that allowed the democratic 
system to survive, it also cost a lot in terms of efficiency (Di Pahna, 1977). It led to an 
incoherent legislative pattern characterized by an overflow of insignificant laws, known in 
Italian as leggine (little laws) (De Micheli and Verzichelli, 2004: 95). 
This blocked political situation - which characterized Italy in its first 40 years of history as a 
republic - first began to be challenged in the early 1990s. According to Gundle and Parker 
(1996), what happened in Italy between 1992 and 1994 was a true political earthquake. 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the consequent end of the communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe, the PCI - led by Achille Occhetto - transformed into the new 
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). The end of the so-called "communist threat" then 
allowed for new political scenarios and, eventually, to a redistribution of power. 
Mea,1while, in a wave of antipolitical sentiment, two referenda modified the electoral law: in 
1991, a vote expressing one single preference in legislative elections was introduced; in 1992, 
the electoral law itself was revoked. 
In the April 1992 general elections, the Christian Democrats' share of votes fell below 30%, 
and the steady growth of the PSI came to a halt. The President of the Republic, Oscar Luigi 
Scalfaro, was nevertheless expected to offer the post of President of the Council of Ministers 
to the PSI leader Bettino Craxi. Meanwhile, however, "Tangentopoli" had begun. Starting 
with a local investigation on bribery in Milan, a huge network of corruption came to light. 
Led by Judge Antonio Di Pietro, the investigations on briberies (known as Tangentopoli) 
would come to represent a major challenge to the political establishment (namely to the DC 
and PSI). It literally destroyed the old party system, leading to the creation of a new one. In 
the event, the President of the Republic offered the top governmental post to the law professor 
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and past Secretruy of State Giuliano Amato. The Amato I government marked a major break 
from its predecessors for the way it was formed and the way it worked. As we shall see in 
Chapter 5, in fact, it was one of the very few governments in Italian history not to be 
dependent upon the political parties . 
. In hopes of reducing the number of parties, a new electoral law (known as Legge 
Mattarellum) was introduced in 1994. It injected elements of majoritarian into the Italian 
electoral system: in the Chamber of Deputies 75% of the MPs were now to be elected on a 
single-turn majority system, while only the remaining 25% were to be distributed on a 
proportional basis. 
In April 1993, at the height of the Tangentopoli investigations, the majority parties' positions 
were defeated in eight referendums in what was described as "the end of a regime" (Bardi, 
1994: 11). A major window of opportunity for reforming the Italian system opened at that 
point, though the opportunity was not seized as well it might have been. Therefore, as we 
shall see, most of the chronic problems of the Italian political and bureaucratic system persist. 
In any event, in Italy today, the term "First Republic" is used to indicate the period before 
Tangentopoli, and "Second Republic" to refer to what has followed. 
In March 1994, legislative elections were held once again: the left-wing parties (re-named for 
the occasion Progressisti) were defeated by the right-wing "dual alliance" created by Silvio 
Berlusconi's Forza Italia, with the Lega Nord (Northern League) in the North and Alleanza 
Nazionale in the South. Welcomed by many as the supposed victory of "anti-partitocrazia" 
(Bardi, 1994: I), the coalition rapidly proved its inefficiency and, by the end of 1994, had 
already collapsed. 
Meanwhile, the Italian lira dropped out of the EMS in September 1992 and experienced a 
spectacular decrease in value. Lamberto Dini, Minister of the Treasury in the Berlusconi I 
government and a former Director General of Banca d 'Italia, was named President of the 
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Council and formed a "non"partisan" govermnent. Ironically, Dini eventually governed thanks 
to the support of the center-left parties, which had, in the meanwhile, created a new coalition 
(l'l.nivo, or the Olive Tree) and won the April 1995 administrative elections. At the end of 
1995 -once the annual financial bill was passed in parliament- discussions took place over 
the future of the govermnent, in view of the forthcoming Italian presidency of the EU 
(January-June 1996). 
Though the govermnent did not manage to obtain a positive vote on a comprehensive 
parliamentary resolution over the incoming EU presidency by the end of 1995, it nevertheless 
appeared at first that it would stay in power until the end of the semester. Five documents 
were in fact approved, and presented, respectively, by Pezzoni, Andreatta-Berlinguer-Lega, 
CCDCCDU, Costa, and Stirk Lievers (La Stampa, December 8, 1995). This division-was in 
itself a sign of the changing times in the Italian political scenario. 
Yet legislative elections were called again for April 21, 1996 (!1 Sele 2 4 Ore, February I 7, 
.J-9%1, right in the middle of the Italian presidency. They were won by L 'U/ivo (the Olive 
Tree) coalition, and thus, on May 17, 1996, just one month before the Florence European 
Council, the Prodi I govermnent was formed (Il Sele 21 Ore, May 18, 1996). However, while 
the coalition had enough votes to support its govermnent in the Senate, that was not the case 
in the Chamber. The govermnent thus became dependent upon the external support of the new 
communist party, Rifondazione Comunista (RC), a fact that was to harm the government's 
European and foreign policies on several occasions. 
Since then, two opposing coalitions have alternated in power: Berlusconi's Polo delle Liberta 
and Prodi's Ulivo. The so-called "Polo" is a center-right coalition formed by conservative 
post-Christian Democrats, northern separatists (Northern League), post-fascists (AIIeanza 
Nazionale) and Berlusconi's own party (Forza ltalia). The Olive Tree is essentially a center-
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··•. left coalition formed by progressive post-Christian Democrats, various post-communist 
parties, Greens and a number of minor, more or less "personal" parties (Dini's, Di Pietro's, 
etc). 
For the first time since 1968, Italy has experienced parliamentary stability: in 2006, the 
legislature ended its natural five-year cycle. Also, for the first time since 1953, a President of 
the Council (Berlusconi) has stayed in power for the full five-year term (though his term was 
divided into two distinct governments- Berlusconi II and Berlusconi Ill -
Despite these developments, the number of parties in parliament has not decreased: the 1996-
2000 legislature featured some forty different political groups in parliament and an eight-party 
government coalition. In 2006, yet another new electoral law was approved by the parliameni 
(Law 270/2005): this law introduced, among other things, blocked lists of candidates to be 
presented in each of the 26 electoral constituencies. Hence, today, voters can only choose the 
party to vote for - not the individual candidate. In turn, the parties choose whether to be 
formally linked to one of the running coalitions and the other parties comprising it. The 
parties can also indicate the name of the person they wish to govern in case of victory (though 
this is not formally binding, because the Constitution says that the President of the Council is 
chosen by the President of the Republic, see Chapter 5). The new system is a proportional 
one, with two correctives: a minimum threshold has to be reached (4% for electoral lists that 
are not linked to any coalition; 2% for those having established a formal link with one of the 
running coalitions) and a majority reward is offered the winning coalition if it does not gain 
340 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Guzzetta-Marini, 2006: 235-237). Since the 
Constitution says that senators are to be elected on a regional basis, the majority bonus in the 
Senate is redistributed on a regional basis (Guzzetta-Marini, 2006: 235-237), thereby 
accentuating the difference in political composition between the two Chambers. This 
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discrepancy has essentially served to nnllify the expected positive effects of the new law (i.e. 
governability): the current Prodi II government, for example, enjoys a majority in the Senate 
only when the "for lifers" (permanent Senators) vote alongside the governing coalition. The 
cumbersome new Jaw also gives paramount power once again to the political parties since, by 
deciding where to place candidates on the lists, it is those parties' leaders who decide who 
will be elected and who won't. 
The overall result of the law is that a high level of fragmentation still characterizes the Italian 
parliament. It currently counts sixteen political groups in the Chamber and ten in the Senate. 
Consequently, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the Prodi II government (2006- ) is composed of a 
coalition of nine parties whose political differences have often forced Prodi to resort to votes 
of confidence, even for the adoption of ordinary bills: eight such votes took place just from 
May 17 to October 27, 2006. Once again, a new solution is being sought, and over 800,000 
signatures have already been collected with the aim to amend the current Jaw 
( www .referendumelettorale.org). 
Things changed substantially with the elections held on the 21" if April 2008, following an 
early fall of the Prodi II Government. Credit must be given to the new Democratic Party's 
leader Waiter Veltroni, for his decision to run his campaign without allying his party with the 
small leftist parties. This initiative toward disaggregation was to a certain extent mirrored on 
the right. During the electoral campaign, both Veltroni and Berlusconi repeatedly appealed to 
the electorate to cast a "useful vote." The Italian people overwhelmingly responded to the 
call, thereby simplifying the existing political system. It is an important call for change that 
must not go unacknowledged. ln a country that, historically, is quite fragmented and 
polarized, the voters' choice to back away from the smaller parties is a remarkable one. The 
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frrst immediate result was the winnowing of the n~ber of parties in the parliament to six -
35 had contested the elections but most failed to pass the 4% popular vote threshold 
requirement. The parties in parliament include the progressive Democratic Party and its ally 
Italia dei Valori; the centrist Union of Christian Democrats; the centre-right Freedom Party 
and its allies Northern League and Autonomy Movement. In 2009, there will be new elections 
in Italy-as elsewhere in the EU--for the European Parliament. According to political scientist 
Simon Hix, voters usually treat these elections as mid-term elections~ an opportunity to judge 
the work of their national governments, rather than to vote on European issues. In Italy, such a 
vote will be critical one. The desapparecidos will try to get back into the political 
scene. If the current window of opportunity is used wisely, Italians will likely vote once again 
for the bigger parties. The historic transition will thus be concluded. 
Attitudes towards European integration 
Italians are known to be among the most convinced supporters of the process of European 
integration. This is consistent with their vision, their interpretation of history, and their 
reading of the role the peninsula is to play within the continent. 
The Romans perceived themselves as pivotal in securing the peace and civilization of the 
continent. Their cosmopolitan values and their contribution to the spread of civilization 
throughout the then-known world (the idea of pax romana and romana civitas) are 
highlighted in a positive way in Italian schoolbooks. Ancient Rome is considered one of the 
most glorious periods in the country's long history. Centuries later, Dante - the most 
important of all Italian writers and the first to use the Italian language (in his Divine Comedy) 
-underlined, in De Monarchia (1310-1313), how the only way to achieve true justice was 
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through world unity (the "world" as he knew it of course). In such a process of unification, the 
Roman people were to play the pivotal role: it was their birthright. 
During the Risorgimento period, the claim for a "united Europe" was considered within the 
context of freeing Italy from foreign rule. Unity, indeed, was seen as a way to reach that goal. 
The most influential philosophers and politicians of the Risorgimento period supported the 
idea of a better and more peaceful future for the peninsula within the context of a (united) 
Europe. Thus, in Rinnovamento (1851 ), Vincenzo Gioberti advocated a social-democratic 
renewal throughout Europe, in which the Italian national resurgence could take place. Cesare 
Balbo's Le speranze d'Italia (1844) stressed that an Italian federation (without the Austrians) 
would have contributed enormously to the stability of all Europe: Other people, like Giuseppe 
Ferrari, promoted the idea of broader federalism as the result of the free will and action of the 
people (La rivoluzione e le riforme in It alia, 1851 ). According to Carlo Cattaneo, only the 
United States of Europe could ever secure peace and prosperity on the continent 
( Considerazioni in fine del prima volume dell' "Archivio triennale "). 
Giuseppe Mazzini, a major promoter of a united (and republican) Italy and founder of the 
movement in favor of Italian independence La giovine Ita/ia was a strong supporter of the 
United States of Europe, too. Mazzini, who, not by chance, was also founder of La giovine 
Europa (Young Europe), conceived of the nation as a means by which to achieve a better life 
for all people. Hence, Europe was to be shaped by 13 or 14 nation states (where "nation" had 
a spiritual and historical, rather than territorial or racial, meaning), each of them having a 
mission of their own, in the view of overall improvements. 
To the Italian people today, therefore, a more integrated Europe follows a logical continuum 
in their history. They still believe it is the best way to secure democracy and peace. Moreover, 
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as the EEC made its frrsts steps during the so-called "economic miracle" period, the 
· Communities came to be associated with an improved socio-economic lifestyle. 
"Eurobarometer" polls show how Italians see a significant correlation between their socio-
economic and political sitnation and the process of European integration. Indeed, when 
budget restraints became necessary to join EMU, Italians paid, without complaining, an ad 
hoc tax in order to get rid of their lira and its troubles for good. In fact, as the Italian system 
was entering into a deep crisis, the EC began to be perceived as the only chance to bring order 
into the national system: thus, the demand for supranational structnres also came to represent 
a demand for a solution to the inefficiencies of the Italian system. 
The level of knowledge about the institntions of the European Union, as it emerges from the 
Eurobarometer (2002) surveys, is higher in Italy than in other EU countries. The EU 
parliament is by far the best known and most appreciated institntion by Italian citizens, 
followed by the Commission and the CounciL The data also highlights a correlation between 
amount of information and the strength of the positive assessment: the greater the knowledge, 
the greater the appreciation. Citizens generally learn about community institntions through 
television (69%), newspapers (44%), magazines (26%), other citizens (23%), the Internet 
(18%). Nevertheless, as the Eurobarometer (2002) also shows, Italian citizens still perceive 
their own government to be the most influential institntion; the EU' s influence is seen as less 
pronounced (46% of those interviewed think the European Union has "some effect" on their 
lives). Finally, to an absolute majority of Italians, being a member of the Union is "good" 
(69%) while only 3% see it as "bad". For 73% of Italians, in comparison with 49% of 
Europeans on average, the Union has a "very" or "quite" favorable image. Italians are also 
prouder of being European than the av~rage EU citizen: 81% of those interviewed said they 
were "very" or "quite" proud of being European; that figure is only 62% in the EU. 
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The Italian political parties and the process of European integration, from the origins to the 
early 1990s 
The decision to link Italy firmly to the process of European integration was, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, essentially the decision ·Of a small group of leaders, led by the President of the 
Council and head of the Christian Democrats, Alcide De Gasperi, and his Foreign Minister, 
Carlo Sforza. This choice was intrinsically linked to the decision to join the North Atlantic 
Pact in 1949. The DC - a party which would later become a champion of Europeanism - was, 
at the time, divided over the issue. Vera Capperucci (2003: 73) talks about three periods in the 
early DC years: 1948-49, the Atlantic choice; 1950-1954, the Euro-Atlantic strategy; 1954-58, 
neo-Atlanticism. In the very early years of the republic, the left fringes of the DC leadership, 
led by Giuseppe Dossetti and Giovanni Gronchi, were in favor of keeping an equidistant 
relation between the two superpowers: the US and the USSR. They welcomed the prospect of 
a neutral, or non-aligned Italy. Though Italy's terrible economic conditions made it clear that 
the country needed American support - namely via the Marshall Plan - they felt it was 
important to show "dignity" in receiving it The left-wing of the DC thus opposed the 
signature of the North Atlantic Pact As the Communists and the Socialists too were expected 
to vote against the Pact (Capperucci, 2003), De Gasperi desperately needed all his party's 
votes in parliament. In this light, he used Italy's inclusion in a European integration process 
(at the time represented by the Council ofEurope) in order to sell Atlantic integration to the 
DC. In signing the North Atlantic Pact (April 4, 1949), De Gasperi underlined its political 
rather than military aspects. Also, soon afterwards (May 5, 1949), he signed the founding 
treaty of the Council of Europe. Last but not least, his government meanwhile negotiated a 
commercial agreement with Moscow. These linkages and ambiguities were to have an impact 
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on Italy's foreign policy, however (Varsori, 1998: 74) as we shall see in the following 
paragraphs. 
One year later, in 1950, the decision to join the European Coal and Steel Community was, 
once again, essentially a De Gasperi-Sforza one. De Gasperi 's idea was that Italy could better 
defend its national interests only within a policy of European solidarity (Telo, 1996: 195-196). 
In addition, involvement in supranational European institutions would help strengthen the 
domestic political system and the new-born democracy (Cotta, 1992: 206-207; Ferraris, 1992: 
131 ). European integration was seen as a fundamental opportunity for the peninsula. Joining 
the ECSC, once again, was a political decision. Indeed, there were several reservations about 
technical issues. Piero Craveri (2003) talks about an external bond in relation to De Gasperi's 
vision of European integration: he says that, thanks to Italy's participation in the European 
Communities, De Gasperi aimed to make up for what he could not achieve on the national 
institutional level. 
Despite some internal divisions in the 1960s and a new anti-European crisis in the 1970s, the 
European choice- strictly linked with the Atlantic one- came to represent a widespread and 
founding principle shared by the whole Christian Democratic party. In particular, in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, the party undertook a marked activism at the European level, also 
thanks to leaders like Giulio Andreotti or Emilio Colombo (as seen in Chapter 3). However, 
as Niccolo Conti and Luca Verzichelli (2005) point out, the style was more "reactive" than 
"proactive"; there was a distinct Jack of continuity and of strategy in the DC's European 
policy, especially as foreign policy was considered a minor issue in comparison to domestic 
politics. 
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As for the other parties of the governing coalition during De Gasperi's time, the two smaller 
ones - the Liberals (PLI) and the Republicans (PR!) - were convinced supporters of the 
process of European integration. In particular, PLI leaders like Luigi Einaudi - first as 
Governor of the Bank ofltaly, then as a minister and fmally as President of the Republic- or 
Gaetano de Martino -as Foreign Minister- were De Gasperi's fundamental allies. Craveri 
(2003: 57!) considers Einaudi and Sforza a sort of alter ego to De Gasperi as, unlike the 
President of the Council, they shared the classical vision of foreign policy in terms of power 
politics. The Liberals' Western choice was a convinced one - indeed, one of the pillars of the 
party's identity. The situation with the Republicans was similar: Ugo La Malfa, the party's 
historical leader, felt European federalism was an ideal to pursue; each step in that direction 
(for instance, signing the ECD) was thus to be encouraged (Soddu, 2003). 
The two major parties of the left- PCI and PSI -felt differently. Since the very early days of 
the republic, both the Communists and the Socialists were very negative towards Atlantic and 
'European issues, perceived as a form of "submission" to the US (Ginsburg, 1990: 110-112). 
For a start, the Socialist leader Pietro Nenni considered foreign policy a depend~nt variable of 
domestic politics and felt that, as such, it should be used solely to serve Italian national 
interests. That meant, in his mind, that Italy should not enter the North Atlantic Treaty -
which he perceived as a threat to the USSR and a number of other UN member states - nor 
any European Community, including the Council of Europe. 
This strict loyalty to the USSR isolated the Italian Socialist party from its fellow European 
ones. Indeed, so strong was Nenni's opposition to European integration that in May 1950 the 
party explicitly forbid its members to join the European Federalist Movement(!). Yet, with 
the beginning of a gradual distension in East-West relations in the following years, Nenni 
began to think that new spaces for maneuvering were available to the PSI and slowly came to 
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acknowledge the European status quo. The definitive break with USSR foreign policy came 
with the Suez and the Hungarian crises of 1956. Nenni thus decided to name a party 
commission to study the question of the two new communities: the EEC and Euratom. 
Though not without criticizing the government for the way it handled the negotiations, the 
commission recommended abstaining on the EEC and voting in favor of Euratom (Scirocco in 
Craveri, 2003). Meanwhile, Nenni had been eo-opted into Jean Monnet's Comite d'Ac;tion 
(Monnet: 1976). The change in the PSI's approach to foreign policy then allowed the party to 
join the majority supporting the government in 1958 and to enter the government in 1963. 
From then on, they would remain pro-European. 
The conversion to European values of the Communist Party·was slower and less linear. 
Today, in the national political culture, a myth surrounds the party- as if the PC! had always 
been pro-European. However, the recent opening of the Moscow archives has allowed for a 
correct reconstruction of the facts by historians. The files in Moscow confirm the PC!' s long 
dependence on the USSR- botl_J from a policy and a monetary point of view (Guiso, 2003: 
207). The Italian communist political discourse was centered on the defense of the Italian 
national interest - first and foremost, the geopolitical one (Guiso 2003: 219). The PCI 
demonstrated several times against the Americans and against the European Communities. 
The party had a fierce aversion to any form of European or Atlantic integration. 
Some isolated communist leaders - like Giorgio Amendola or Gian Carlo Pajetta - at times 
showed a timid interest in some initiatives launched by Christian Democrat leaders - like 
Amintore Fanfani, or Giovanni Gronchi, with his Ost-po/itik - but that was about it The 
events of 1956 and the brutal repression of the Hungarian uprise was a difficult moment for 
the PC!. Yet, unlike the PSI, the party remained firmly alongside the USSR. 
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Though the PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti, was quick to suppress any idea that departed from 
the party's official one, the first cracks in the party line were nevertheless starting to appear: 
the communist trade union (CGIL), for instance, felt the EEC would help the Italian economic 
recovery. Finally, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent changes to the world 
scenario, the PCI started to change, too. When, in 1969, the frrst Communists were appointed 
to the European parliament, the PCI began to overhaul its foreign policy (Guiso, 2003). By 
the time of the first direct election of the European parliament (1979), the European Federalist 
leader, Altiero Spinelli, was elected as an independent in the electoral lists of the PCI, thus 
completing the party's total reversal, into pro-European values (Spinelli, 1992). 
Yet, such alignment on pro-European values of the various Italian parties did not result in a 
more pro active Italian European foreign policy; rather, a "de-politicization" of Italian foreign 
policy started to take place. Gradually, the EC became a non-issue in the Italian political 
arena. According to former Ambassador Sergio Romano, Europe is an icon before which 
Italian politicians quickly kneel before moving onto other things. Seldom has strong political 
leadership emerged on European policy. There are some exceptions: that was the case in 1985 
and in 1990, as seen in Chapter 3, but it was rather the result of individual action on the part 
of a few leaders than of a concrete policy underwritten by the Italian parties. 
It is the Italian dimension rather than the European one which appeals to national politicians. 
They- in a pure party-based logic- tend to consider "Euro-jobs" as (well paid) .retirement or 
interim positions, just to tide them over until they can get back into the national political 
arena. The EC/EU has also been used by Italian politicians to legitimize their own actions 
(Colla, 1992: 211 ). In fact, European constraints are often cited to justify otherwise unpopular 
fiscal and monetary measures. Some headlines from leading Italian newspapers make this 
clear: "The Twelve ask for tears and blood" (La Repubblica, May 5, 1992); "Privatization? It 
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is imposed by fue EC" (Corriere del/a Sera, August 3, 1992). Several parties have also 
promoted such a dangerous view wifu regard to fue euro, as we shall see in Chapter 5. 
The Italian political parties and the process of European integration from the early 1990s 
to today 
Have fuings changed wifu fue arrival of fue so-called II Republic? Has fue political turmoil 
experienced by fue Italian party system had an effect on European policy-making? 
The Italian political system underwent a great upheaval in fue 1990s, and this had a number of 
consequences bofu in national debate about Europe and in European decision-making. 
At fue European level, fue most important changes have been a shift in the membership of the 
European political families and in their internal schemes of alliances - fue most visible 
concerning the European People's Party (EPP). Wifuin the EPP, two parties had ruled above 
the ofuers for a long time: the Italian DC and the German CDU-CSU. The two parties held bi-
annual consultations (often at the CDU-CSU villa on Lake Como) where they concerted their 
positions. The Adenauer Foundation in Rome, together with fue Italian Christian Democratic 
Foundation were also used for the ongoing dialogue. A good example of the Italian-German 
entente is the Genscher-Colombo Plan, submitted to all the member states on November 6, 
1981, which led to the Solemn Declaration on European Union of June 17-19, 1983. 
Important collaboration also took place, as seen in Chapter 3, during the Italian presidencies 
of 1985 and 1990. Around the Germans and the Italians revolved a number of "satellites", of 
which the core consisted of the Benelux Christian Democratic parties. This group of parties 
was able to impose its pro-federalist views upon the others within the EPP. 
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A first crisis within the EPP appeared with the inclusion. of the Spanish Partido Popular, 
which the Italians fiercely opposed. Then, when the first signs of collapse of the DC started to 
appear, the other EPP parties felt they could benefit by gaining a greater share of power. 
When the first split took place within the DC (1993), it was the new Italian Popular Party 
(PP!) that inherited a seat in the EPP. The party's transformation and, most of all, its center-
left orientation was neither understood nor welcomed by an EPP that was becoming 
progressively more conservative. The new party leader, Mino Martinazzoli, instead of 
assiduously attending the EPP meetings, in order to lobby other parties, missed most of them: 
it turned out he was afraid to fly. In a typical parochial yet arrogant Italian manner, the 
leadership completely underestimated the impact of its changes on the other EPP members 
and continued to rely on the alliance with the German and the Benelux parties. But things had 
changed. Then, the DC heir split again (XXXX) and the EPP promoted an agreement between 
the old leadership and the new: in a famous Nice meeting, the secessionist, Rocco Buttiglione, 
was "awarded" the old Christian Democrat symbol, while the remaining leadership kept the 
(newer) name: Partito Popolare (PP!). Complete collapse was just around the corner. 
Meanwhile, Silvio Berlusconi, the new leader of the center -right coalition, had become 
President of the Council-(1994). His nine months in office clearly showed him that isolation at 
the European level was a potential danger to his possible future governments. Therefore, 
Berlusconi put a tremendous effort into bringing his own party, Forza ltalia, into the EPP. 
That was done by using both traditional political channels (MEPs like Claudio Azzolina or 
Antonio Tajani were fundamental in this process), as well as through Berlusconi's own 
"personal diplomacy". Aznar's former personal assistant Alejandro Agag- at the time EPP's 
Deputy Secretary General and then Secretary General - was invited to vacation on 
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Berlusconi's boat and at his villas in Sardinia, for example. Berl\lsconi also invited Aznar's 
son and daughter at times. Legend has it that, during one of these romantic holidays on 
Berlusconi's boat, young Alejandro fell in love with Ana,Aznar's daughter. Berlusconi was 
hence rewarded with EPP membership (indeed Forza Italia is today a major actor within the 
EPP), as well as an invitation to the wedding. 
PPI put up a fight, but it was far too late. The Italian Popular Party had no negotiating force 
left to oppose Forza Italia's entrance, and its opposition only contributed to its further 
relegation into a corner. Meanwhile, Pier Ferdinando Casini's small party (UDC) had become 
a member of the EPP, too. For some time, Lamberto Dini's and Mario Segni's tiny parties 
were part of the EPP as well and, in 200 I, Clemente Mastella' s essentially southern party 
(UDEUR) was finally accepted, too. The worst thing was that all these Italian parties - in 
itself a phenomenon difficult to understand abroad -inevitably tended to seize the occasion of 
EPP meetings to fight over domestic matters. 
Today, three Italian parties belong to the EPP: Forza ltalia, UDC and UDEUR., plus the 
regional party Siidtiroler Volkspartei as an observer. Though Forza ltalia enjoys relevant 
strength within the EPP due to its size, the prestige and power of the former DC are lost 
forever. Forza ltalia itself, with its special relations to the Spanish and other conservative 
parties, has contributed to a genetic change in the EPP leadership: no longer social, Christian 
and pro-European, the party has become conservative and far less pro-European. A question 
mark remains today over the question of whether Alleanza Nazionale - Gianfranco Fini's 
post-fascist party- will also succeed in entering the EPP. 
The story is easier as far as Italian membership in SOC, the socialist family of parties in 
Europe, is concerned. The new Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), born, as mentioned, in 
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1990 out of the ashes of the former PCI, quickly applied for membership in the socialist 
family. The declining Italian Socialist Party (PSI), at first fiercely opposed to the move, came 
around in November 1992, at the Berlin Congress, when the PSI leader Bettino Craxi was 
faced with fact that he could no longer delay their entrance. Today, there are two Italian 
parties within the European Socialists: the Democratic Left, and the Democratic Socialists As 
the center-left political scenario is once again changing in Italy, it remains to be seen where 
the new Democratic Party will sit in the European parliament after the 2009 European 
Parliament elections. 
As for the other parties, once the European Liberal family (ELDR) - previously the tlllrd 
strongest in the European parliament - lost the two small but active PLI and PRI, it began to 
decline, leading to what is now a much more heterogeneous group. 
In the domestic arena, things changed considerably, too. From the 1970s to 1990s, unlike in 
other European countries, EU issues were not used as a tool of domestic political 
confrontation. With the creation of two alternative coalitions - center-right and center-left -
that changed. 
According to Gianni Bonvicini ( 1996) the first centre-right government, between 1994 and 
1995, a greater assertiveness came to characterize Italian foreign policy and affect the balance 
between Europe and the USA. In his programmatic speech to the Italian parliament, Silvio 
Berlusconi declared that Italy was to play "a leading role" in the European Union (11 Sole 24 
Ore, May 17, 1994), and while his Minister for Agriculture, Adriana Poli Bortone, affirmed 
that Italy was going "to play bard in Brussels" (11 Sole 24 Ore, July 16, 94). Most of all, 
Foreign Minister Antonio Martini, a member of Margaret Thatcher's Club de Bruges, favored 
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a position of "qualified integrationism" and was critical of the nascent Economic and 
Monetary Europe (Brighi, 2008). A number of confrontational episodes took place in this 
phase: For example, Italy opposed Slovenia's EU membership bid {11 Sole 24 Ore, July 17, 
1994 and August 31, 1994) and almost created a diplomatic incident when the German CDU 
proposed a two-speed Europe, placing Italy in the circle of "late corners" (/1 Sole 24 Ore, 
September 3, 1994). This, together with the international political isolation of the Berlusconi I 
government, relegated Italy to a lesser role in the European arena. 
In 1996, national elections were won by the center-left Olive Tree coalition. The Prodi I 
government made a concerted effort to relocate Italy in the European arena, in particular by 
focusing on economic reforms needed to successfully fulfill the EMU criteria. ·Yet Prodi's 
handling of the EU presidency (1996) was far less successful than that of previous ones. Also, 
the Prodi I government suffered from the anti-European stance of its ally, Rifondazione 
Comunista. 
As mentioned above, the Rifondazione votes in the Chamber of Deputies wete necessary to 
Prodi's survival, but the party, born of a split in the PDS and still believing in communism as 
a viable solution, had reverted to the original communist opposition to both European 
integration and NATO. The positions of the Rifondazione Comunista therefore caused trouble 
with regard to the economic reforms Italy had to undertake in order to follow the path towards 
EMU. In this sense, the Rifondazione aligned itself with the Northern League - a far-right 
party - in opposition to EU integration, thus definitively breaking the general consensus on 
European integration that had characterized the Italian political system since the early 1 980s. 
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Silvio Berlusconi went back in power (200 1) with a solid parliamentary majority, allowing 
him more freedom in foreign policy than ever any government before. In particular, he was 
definitely more pro-American than any of his predecessors, at the expense of the relations 
with traditional European and Middle East partners. According to Andreatta (2008: 175), that 
lead to an "unbalanced foreign policy in which bilateral relations with the Bush administration 
took precedent over multilateral relations with Europe, leading to frequent tensions with EU 
institutions and partners [ ... ] Most prominent was the support given to the Bush 
Administration's global war on terror after 9/11, which implied significant and unprecedented 
positions.". Berlusconi also invested much of his "personal diplomacy" to build a preferential 
relations with Russia Presdiente Vladimir Putin and invested heavily on relations with 
countries like the UK or Israel. According to Elisabetta Brighi (2008: 1 04): the government 
seemed to believe that "a more assertive Italian foreign policy passed from Washington thus 
equating Atlanticism with nationalism [ ... while ... ] a significant number of influential 
ministers [ ... ] have professed a particularly complex brand of euro-scepticism which the 
Prime Minister has qualified as Eurorealism.". 
The II Prodi (2006-2008) government on the contrary had among its objectives that of 
relocating European integration at the. center of the Italian foreign policy. Yet, as seen in 
Chapter 2, in doing he followed the tradition and the rather passive strategic approach of the 
Christian Democrat governments of the past, apparently without understanding that the new 
times needed the designing of a new strategies - even in the line of the traditional pro~ 
European Italian stance. 
In the 2008 electoral campaign, for the first time since the early 1990s, Europe did not 
constitute a divisive issue any more - indeed, it was hardly mentioned in the parties' 
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programs and in the debates. Berlusconi's "Freedom People" (an electoral merging of Forza 
Italia and National Alliance) mentioned the need to respect the obligations deriving from the ) 
EU Treaties, while safeguarding Italian interests in the EU, while the Democratic Party (the 
newborn post-catholic and post communist party) affirmed to believe in a·rather vague "more 
Europe as possible" ("Europa massima possible") ( UniEuropa, April2008). 
Once elected, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the IV Berlusconi govermnent showed continuity 
rather than the contrary with the previous govermnent in foreign policy and namely in 
European policies and confirmed a positive attitude towards the EU, as the Parliament's 
unanimous vote on the Treaty of Lisbon confirmed. 
In general terms, it is therefore correct to say that from the early 1990s to the late 2000s there 
have been differences in the perception of European integration (and Transatlantic relations) 
by the two main political coalitions and these have been at times used in the domestic political 
debate as a mean of confrontation, in a stop-and-go argument over "European values" and 
"Italian interests" and over who is best fit to preserve them (Cotta, Isemia, Verzichelli, 2005). 
The I Berlusconi Govermnent (1994-95) seemed to privilege Transatlantic relations over 
European integration, while the II and Ill Berlusconi Govermments (200 1-2006) would stress 
and use the good relations with the Bush administration to gain respectability and influence at 
home and in Europe. Viceversa the two Prodi government (1998-98 and 2006-08) would 
stress European integration as the founding value of the Italian foreigil policy and where 
suspected of having a worst relation with the US. 
Also, ' European integration have been a source of internal tensions m both coalitions, 
essentially for the anti-European stance of the Northern League on the right and of 
Ri[ondazione Comunista on the left. On the contrary, the other Euro-skeptic parties, had 
slowly regained a pro-European front. For instance, in his first speech at newly elected 
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President of the Chamber of Deputies (29th April 2008) Gianfranco Fini, National Alliance's 
leader, insisted on European values confirming his and his party total "conversion" to pro-
European values (www.camera.it). 
But the 2008 elections brought more to Italy than National Alliance total reconversion to 
European values. It brought as mentioned a much simplified political framework. Freed from 
the little extremist parties, where the only possible Euroskeptic party remained in Parliament 
is in fact the Northern League. 
In turn, in his programmatic speech to the Parliament, Silvio Berlusconi (291h April 2008) left 
behind the old rhetoric of Italy's power politics, in favor of a speech of a rather "ecumenical" 
flavor. Indeed only briefly mentioned the future Italian foreign policy and Europe in particolar 
- "11 ruolo dell'Italia in Europa e ne! mondo [ ... ] saranno la bussola della nostra politica come 
Paese fondatore del progetto europeo, come grande nazione mediterranea, naturahnente 
chiamata alia cooperazione tra le due sponde del nostro mare e come pilastro dell'amicizia tra 
Europa e Stati Uniti d'America" (http://banchedati.camera.it/tiap _16/ctrStartPage.asp) - thus 
leaving his Foreign Minister Franco Frattini the task of specifying what would be the new 
Italian foreign policy. 
In presenting it to the Italian Parliament (2nd July 2008) Frattini confirmed the impressions of 
those who noticed the fundamental impact of the time spent as European Commissioner in his 
action and values. But most of all, he gave the impression that, for the first time since the 
early 1990s, Italy's foreign policy, and namely European policy, would be in the sign of 
continuity rather than of the contrary. Indeed, Europe occupied the central role in his speech. 
Despite touching upon the role of Italy in the rest of the world, namely Transatlantic relations, 
Middle East, relations with Russia, the other international multilateral forums etc, in fact, 
most of Frattini speech was in fact devoted most of his speech to the future of European 
integration and the role of Italy in it, defined as the first axe of the Italian foreign policy to be, 
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the other being Transatlantic relations, without the two being in contradiction with each other 
(http://www.esteri.it). The only policy issue Of major difference between the previous Foreign 
Minister, Massimo D' Alema is the attitude towards Israel, that in Frattini's case is even. 
defmed as of fiiendship. The concrete example of such renewed entente on pro-European 
values have been the unanimous vote with which the Parliament approved the Lisbon Treaty 
(31 July 2008). 
The Italian parliament and the EU until the early I 990s 
The participation of the Italian parliament in domestic decision-making on EU affairs was 
slow and gradual to emerge. 
From the early Community years until the Single European Act, the Italian parliament 
maintained a "low level ofEuropeanization" (Rometsch and Wessels, 1996: 354) because of 
its weak structural adaptation, the minimal time and energy it devoted to the scrutiny of EC 
law, and its general lack of interest in a greater role. Initially, Community affairs were seen as 
a component of foreign policy. Therefore, they were considered primarily a matter for the 
government. The Chamber of Deputies and Senate did not establish standing committees for 
European affairs, nor did they set up a specific scrutiny procedure. In both Houses, EC 
legislation and policies were reviewed - sporadically- by the committees for foreign affairs, 
through the normal parliamentary procedures. 
In 1968, the Senate established an ad hoc body for dealing with European Affairs- the Giunta 
per gli affari delle Comunita europee. This decision can be seen as a signal of change in the 
approach towards EU affairs. However, the Giunta was just an ad hoc body, not a standing 
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committee, and had ollly fact-fmding and consultative functions. Consequently, it had a small 
impact on parliamentary activities. 
Over· this period, a significant backlog emerged as regards the implementation of EC 
directives. More and more frequently, the European Court of Justice condenmed Italy for its 
failure to implement EC law in a correct aud/or timely fashion. As EC directives were mainly 
implemented through legislative acts, the parliament and its cumbersome law-making 
procedures were often fmgered as the main reason for the recurrent implementation deficit. 
The Single European Act and the expected wave of directives for the completion of the 
internal market fmally provided the catalyst for a radical reorganization of internal decision-
making on EU matters. 
Between I 987 and 1989 the parliament adopted two laws providing the general framework for 
domestic decision-making on EU affairs:. Law 183/1987, otherwise known as the Fabbri Law, 
and Law 86/1989, also knows as the La Pergola Law. Taken together, the two Jaws introduced 
a number of innovations: they re-defined the government's structures for the coordination of 
the national position on EU policies, they made it the government's duty to transmit EC draft 
legislation to parliament, and they formalized the parliament's right to adopt resolutions on 
EU matters. Finally, the La Pergola Law also set up a mechanism for the systematic and 
timely implementation of EU legislation, the so-called "Annual Community Law" (see 
Chapter 5). 
As a result, both the Senate (1988) and the Chamber of Deputies (1990) adapted their internal 
rules of procedure in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new legal 
framework. First, special procedures were established to deal with EC policies. Secondly, 
standing committees were empowered to express their position on EC proposals, in a 
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resolution addressed to the government. The Italian parliament came to see participation in 
decision-making on EU affairs not as a way to assert control over Brussels, but as a 
"temporary extension" of its traditional law-making and scrutiny function at a national level, 
justified by the so-called democratic deficit at the European level. 
In organizational terms, the development of specific structures and procedures to deal with 
EC matters was a smooth process. As the tasks and competencies entrusted to specialized 
committees were new, they did not threaten the position of the powerful standing committees. 
In practice, the reforms had a limited impact and parliament's influence on EU affairs 
remained marginal. The parliament's information on EC business was generally insufficient 
and irregular. The government often failed to fulfill its duty to transmit the Commission's. 
proposals and presented its written reports with significant delays. Even the most significant 
innovation brought about by Law 86/1989 - the power to examine proposals for EC 
legislation - remained under-used. Parliamentary committees examined and debated only a 
few EC proposals and the number of resolutions on EC affairs it adopted was even smaller 
{Bindi and Grassi, 200 I). 
On the other hand, the parliament actively developed formal and informal relationships with 
other national legislatures, as well as with the European parliament. The Assises in July 1990, 
and the first formal meeting of the COSAC were housed by the Italian parliament in Rome. 
And while ;ontacts between national MPs and Italian MEPs were "unsystematic, disorganized 
and irregular", the standing committees did make frequent contact with their counterparts in 
the European parliament, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. 
Reforms since the mid-1990s 
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Unlike in other countries, such as France or Portugal or Germany, in Italy the Maastricht 
Treaty did not r.rise a debate on parliamentary sovereignty. Nor did it prompt a revision of the 
domestic framework for EU decision-making. However, the Amsterdam Treaty, and 
subsequently the Constitutional Treaty, did trigger a new wave of reforms, a sign of 
significant progress in the Europeanization of the Italian parliament. In a context dominated 
by the national effort to ensure entry into the euro area, the rationale behind the reforms was 
to promote a greater and more proactive national participation in EU decision-making, and to 
adapt the domestic institutional framework to the need to compete/cooperate effectively with 
partner member states within a more integrated Union. 
Although the reforms were driven by a general common inspiration, they were fragmented 
over a series of amendments to Law 187/1983 and Law 86/1989. With regards to the 
parliament, these reforms ~ embodied in the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty (Law 
209/1998) and the ratification of Community acts for 1995-1997 (Law 128/1998), 1998 (Law 
25/1999), 1999 (Law 526/1999), 2000 (Law 422/2000) and 2001 (Law 39/2002) ~expanded 
the scope of parliamentary scrutiny, obliging the government to forward all draft EU 
legislation, including second and third pillar acts. They also served to simplify and rationalize 
the presentation of government reports on EU affairs (Law 25/1999) and they introduced a 
"soft version" of parliamentary scrutiny reserve (Law 422/2000). 
As had already been the case for the first wave of reforms after the SEA, the changes in the 
general institutional framework for relations between Italy and the EU were followed by a 
revision of the domestic parliamentary rules of procedure. The Chamber of Deputies 
significantly revised its internal rules of procedure in 1997 and in 1999; the Senate in 
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February 2000 and 2003. These changes addressed a number of issues left unresolved by the 
post-SEA reforms as well as by some newly emerging issues. More importantly, they signaled 
a qualitative change in the· Italian parliament's approach to EU matters. In fact, they drew on 
ideas and suggestions emerging from the international debate on better regulation, and they 
often referred to best pmctices on the scrutiny of EU affairs as developed by other EU 
members' parliaments. The circulation and exchange of best practices within inter-
parliamentary fora, such as the COSAC or the Conference of Speakers of European 
Parliaments, played a significant role in shaping the reformers' ideas in this phase. 
Meanwhile, as we shall see below, the Chamber of Deputies had finally set up an ad hoc 
Committee for European Affairs (1990) which, a few years later, was awarded important 
powers. 
A number of converging factors have recently led to another wide-ranging revision of the 
legal framework for Italian participation in EU decision-making, with direct implications for 
the role of the parliament. First, at the European level, the Nice Treaty (and the Constitutional 
Treaty) brought about important institutional changes. Secondly, the Italian constitutional 
reform adopted in 200 I substantially modified the competencies and powers of the Regions, 
awarding them a greater role in EU decision-making and in the implementation of EU law, as 
we shall see in Chapter XXX (Constitutional Amendment Act no. 3 of October 18,2001 and 
Law 131/2003). Thirdly, the accumulation of amendments to Law 183/1987 and 8611989 
fragmented the legal fmmework into a plurality of sources, thus raising some issues of clarity 
and consistency. In response to these factors, the parliament adopted Law 11/2005 in early 
2005, which consolidates, clarifies and better. defines the legal framework for Italian 
participation in EU decision-making. This law replaced the Law 187/83 and 8611989 and all 
their subsequent amendments. The 2005 law provides for a comprehensive definition of the 
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domestic decision-making process on EU affairs, on the basis of the principles of 
"subsidiarity, proportionality, efficiency, transparency and democratic participation." While 
the major changes concern the role of the Regions, the law also introduces some important 
innovations with regards to parliamentary participation. These might yet provide the basis for 
a more effective and influential role of the Italian parliament in European affairs. 
The Standing Committees on EU policies: the first phase 
As mentioned above, the Senate created the Giunta per gli affari delle Comunitii europee in 
1968, entrusting it with fact-finding and consultative functions. However, the Giunta was to 
have a minimal impact on parliamentary activities. The Chamber of Deputies only set up its 
Commissione speciale per le politiche comunitarie in 1990. Structure, membership and modus 
operandi of the two organs were similar: they were both ad hoc committees, equal to the 
standing committees in size, structure and functions, but precluded from having full 
legislative power. The Giunta was made up of 24 members and the Commissione speciale of 
48, all of whom also simultaneously served as full members of a standing committee. 
The tw_o committees were relatively "open" structures. The Commissione speciale, with the 
consent of the President of the Chamber, was able to invite Italian members of the European 
parliament to attend its meetings, with the right to speak but not to vote (r. C. Art. 127 ter c. 
1). The Chamber of Deputies' rules of procedures provided, in addition, for a periodical 
meeting of the Commissione speciale with a special delegation from the European parliament 
composed of members of the Bureau of the EP presidency, heads of EP political groups and 
the President of EP committees at the opening and closing of the rotating EC presidency. This 
provision was deleted, however, in the reform adopted in July 1999. The Senate rules of 
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procedure had a slightly more restrictive standing: the attendance of Euro-deputies was 
limited to a single representative for each political group present in the European parliament, 
chosen by common.agreement by the President of the Giunta and its European countetparts (r. 
S. art. 142). 
The Commissione and the Giunta usually met two days a week. The fact that all the members 
were also members of a standing committee however ended up negatively affecting 
attendance at the meetings and, thus, the continuity of their work. Meetings, in fact, had to 
compete for space and time with the different standing committees. 
The two specialized committees had horizontal functions, but they were vested with a greater 
role in the area of EC norm implementation than in the scrutiny of government positions 
within European negotiations. The powerful standing committees had the primary 
responsibility for reviewing proposals for EC legislation in their relative subject areas. The 
specialized committees were entitled to receive all Community documents and could adopt 
resolutions or reports on the institutional aspects of EC activities. They did not have a general 
function of sifting all European proposals and reporting to the standing committees, but they 
could adopt an opinion on a proposal under examination by a standing committee. In 
implementing EC law, the specialized committees played a full coordination role. All draft 
legislation for the implementation of Community directives and regulations, as well as any 
proposals for new legislation which fell within the remit of Community competencies, were to 
be referred to the Giunta and the Commissione speciale with a view to receiving an opinion 
on their consistency with existing Community law (r. C. art. 126, c. 2. r. S. art. 23, cc. 2 and 
4.). 
While the specialized and the standing committees shared the power to monitor government 
conduct within European negotiations, only the specialized committees were empowered to 
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review the twice-yearly government report on Community policy before it was debated in the 
plenary. In addition, the specialized committees were responsible for reviewing Community 
legislation after its adoption and, in the Chamber, the rulings of the European Court of Justice. 
Finally, they could question ministers over EC legislation draft proposals, as well as on 
general EC policy issues. These committees were also allowed to hear high-ranking public 
officials, with the assent of the competent minister. Members of the Chamber of Deputies 
could also employ traditional control and information procedures to raise a debate on 
Community issues. Usually, the two committees had a consensual working style, kept conflict 
low-key, maintained a non-partisan attitude, and entertained dialogue with the executive in an 
informal and cooperative atmosphere. 
The scope of parliamentary scrutiny included the full range of Community legislative 
activities. On the basis of Law 183/1987, the government was to transmit all proposals of 
regulations, directives and decisions within thirty days of their reception, as well as the legal 
acts adopted by Community institutions, together with a short assessment of their impact on 
the domestic legal order. Furthermore, Law 86/1989 provided for enhanced parliamentary 
access to written information on Community developments. Every six months, the 
government was to present to both Houses a report on Italy's _participation in Community 
policy and, every year, a general report focusing on the progress made by the European 
Community towards the achievement of the Internal Market, with special attention paid to the 
effects of regional policies and to the national management of structural funds. The latter 
report was also to cover the activities performed by the WEU and the Council of Europe 
(Articles 7 and 8, Law 86/1 989). 
The Giunta, the Commissione specia/e and the standing committees (in their relative subject 
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areas), could review draft EC legislation once the proposals were published in the Official 
Journal, the Minister being present, and adopt a resolution. In most cases, the review of EU 
proposals was a one-meeting business. Should the political relevance of the issue require it, 
the debate was held over one or more supplementary meetings, allowing members to ask for 
oral or written evidence before deliberating. The scrutiny could end with the adoption of a 
resolution - carrying only a politically binding value - or without a formal decision. Whereas 
the Senate rules of procedure (art. 143 c. 6) expressly stated that the Giunta and the standing 
committees could vote a resolution at the end of the scrutiny process (describing in detail the 
structure of the resolution), the Chamber of Deputies's rules (art. 127) made no reference to a 
formal parliamentary act, simply indicating that the competent committees "may express in a 
fmal report their opinion on the opportunity of future initia.tives." When the committees 
debated resolutions on EU affairs, the government was to be present and could propose 
amendments, ask for the postponement of the vote, or request to defer it to the plenary. The 
scrutiny procedure was a decentralized procedure in line with the parliament's overall 
characteristic as a "working parliament". The plenary was not permitted to debate and/or vote 
on a resolution if it was scheduled to be discussed in a committee. 
Nevertheless, the practice in the nineties was a mixed one. The parliament's information on 
EC business was insufficient and irregular. The government failed to fulfill its duty to 
transmit Commission proposals, and often forwarded the written reports with significant 
delays - usually in a generic and superficial manner - so that any detailed parliamentary 
debate was rendered meaningless. Not surprisingly, the parliament participation in EC policy-
making was marginal. The largest part of the work was carried out by the specialized 
committees, while standing committees and the assembly were to a great extent isolated from 
the European arena. Only a handful of deputies were active and koowledgeable in European 
affairs (Bindi and Grassi, 2001). 
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The case of the EC directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions may 
provide a useful example in analyzing the many contradictions inherent in the role played by 
parliament in those years. The Italian parliament began considering the issue many months 
before the proposal reached the Council for a final decision. In I 997, the standing committee 
on agriculture undertook an inquiry that lasted until October, and ended up asking for the 
rejection of the proposal. Meanwhile, in August 1997, the European Commission had 
submitted to the European Council and Parliament a modified proposal. On November 26, 
1997, the Committee for Agriculture in the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution calling 
upon the govermuent to delay in adopting the directive; on November 27, the Council reached 
a political agreement on a common position. On February 16, 1998, the Committee for Social 
Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies began debating a draft resolution inviting the govermuent 
to oppose the directive; furthermore, they requested a moratorium on the production and use 
of genetically modified organisms in Europe. While the draft resolution was waiting to be 
voted on, the Council adopted the common position; the Italian govermuent abstained. A 
couple of weeks later, the Committee for Social Affairs formally adopted the resolution to 
oppose the directive. On the same day, the Senate passed a motion requesting the suspension 
of the directive and promoting the elaboration of a new directive with more stringent 
requirements for the patentability of biotechnological inventions. Nevertheless, the Council 
approved the directive on July 6, 1998; again, Italy abstained. Later on, the Italian 
govermuent decided to intervene in the action for annulment brought before the European 
Court of Justice by the Dutch govermuent. Pending the Court's judgment, the Italians, given 
their diverging views on the matter, excluded the directive from the Annual Community Bill 
and introduced to parliament a specific piece of legislation to implement the directive. The 
bill met with the resistance of a large coalition of parliamentary forces, which sought to force 
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the government to ask that the directive be rewritten or that concessions be made in the 
implementing legislation. Parliamentary obstruction is now likely to prevent the timely 
implementation of the directive, thus leading to tension with the European Commission. 
This case illustrates not only how little input the parliament generally had in Italy's EU 
decision-making, but also how woefully uncoordinated its attempts at intervention were. Such 
a pattern has led observers to descn'be a protracted low Europeanization of the Italian 
parliament. Some authors have even described the slow adaptation to EU dyoamics as a 
deliberate effort to protect the specific organizational and functional characteristics of the 
Italian parliament from the pressures for change coming from the European arena (Giuliani, 
1996). By the mid-1990s this lack ofEuropeanization was widely perceived as unsatisfactory 
and dysfunctional. Changes at the European level and internal developments then provided 
the catalyst for a second and comprehensive process of reform, which took place after the 
negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty (Bindi and Grassi, 2001). 
The standing committees on EU policy: changes since the late 1990s 
In the years 1998-99 a number of significant reforms took place. The first step was taken on 
August 1, 1996, when the ad hoc committee in the Chamber of Deputies was transformed into 
a standing committee, named "XlV Commission- EU Policies". The objective of this change 
was to raise the political profile and authority of the committee, to facilitate the meetings and 
to make the standing committee an engine for all activities in parliament linked to EU affairs. 
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In 1997 and 1999, the procedures concerning European Mfairs were also significantly revised 
in the Chamber of Deputies itself. All of the reforms had two general goals (which went hand 
in hand with the reform of the government's stroctnre for EU policy management that will be 
described in Chapter 5): first, to update the instrornents for dealing with European affairs, so 
as to promote a proactive and anticipatory style of policy-making and to establish a stricter 
link between the negotiating and implementing phases in EC policy-making; secondly, to 
modify the parliament's philosophy when dealing with European affairs, by introducing the 
issues of quality and of coherence in legislation, along the lines of the OECD guidelines. 
On the whole, four main directions were set in reorganizing the role of the parliament in 
European affairs: (a) to revise the institutional setting, at least in the Chamber; (b) to reinforce 
access to EU information; (c) to update the rules allowing for the scrutiny of EC legislation 
proposals and for political control over government action within European institutions; (d) to 
introduce a policy that would enhance the quality of legislation implementation. 
The Senate was slower in following suit: the Senate's internal rules were only changed in 
February 2000, and only in 2003 was the old Committee on European Affairs finally replaced 
by the Standing Committee on EU policies, also called the "XIV Committee". 
The Senate and the Chamber Committees have a similar stroctnre, with regards to terms of 
reference and powers, though some variations exist as far as size and membership is 
concerned. The Chamber of Deputies' XIV Committee has 43 members, who, in accordance 
with the general rule, cannot be full members of any other standing committee at the same 
time. The Senate's XIV Committee has 27 members; they, on the contrary, can also sit on 
other committees (Senate, Rules of Procedures, art. 21 ). The latter approach is to ensure that 
members of the EU affairs committee combine knowledge of EU affairs with an expertise in 
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subject matters dealt with in the sector-specific committees. This practice also ensures a 
bridge between the wm:k done in the "horizontal" EU committee and in the "vertical" sector-
specific committees. In fact, the Senate Rules of Procedure state that, when standing 
committees are reviewing a legislative proposal, the senators who are also members of the 
XIV Committee have to report on its compatibility with EU law in light of the opinion 
adopted by the Committee. The downside is that double membership can negatively affect 
attendance at meetings and increase membership turn-over. 
The members of the two committees are appointed at the beginning of each parliamentary 
term by the Speakers of the two Houses, reflecting the indications given by parliamentary 
groups and their balance in the plenary. Committees are renewed every two and half years, 
but members can be reappointed. The committees elect a chairman, usually drawn from the 
parliamentary majority, two vice-chairmen and two secretaries, collectively known as the 
Bureau. The chairman represents the committee in its relations with other committees and 
outside the parliament; he or she convenes the meetings, presides over the orderly conduct of 
business and has an influential role in shaping the agenda. The Bureau sets up the calendar of 
meetings. The committees usually meet two or three days a week. Committee meetings are 
closed to the public. However, the minutes of the debates and the relevant· documentation 
under consideration are published shortly after each meeting. In addition, the chairman may 
authorize broadcasting of a session for the press and/or visitors through the internal television 
channel. 
The committees can rely on an effective back-up from parliamentary services. Special 
departments in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies provide for the secretariat of the meetings 
but also monitor EU legislative developments, draft legal opinions and prepare background 
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documentation. Both Houses have also opened an antenna in Brussels, located within the 
building of the European parliament. 
The two conunittees are still "open" structures. With the consent of the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, the two committees may invite members of the European parliament or 
of the European Conunission to provide evidence on the activities and policies of EU 
institutions (Chamber of Deputies, Rules of Procedure, art. 127-ter; Senate, Rules of 
Procedure, art. 144-quater). Both conunittees can hold hearings of public officials from the 
national administration, with the assent of the competent minister, and of representatives from 
economic and social groups or NGOs. They can also acquire all documents necessary for the 
conduct of their fact-finding or scrutiny activities. 
With regards to their powers and responsibilities, both committees have a narrowly defmed 
"own competence". The primary responsibility over the constitutional or horizontal aspects of 
EU activity and on the implementation of EU Treaties is assigned to each of them in the terms 
of reference (Chamber, RoP, arts. 22 and 126; Senate, RoP, art. 23). When it comes to the 
scrutiny of Commission proposals or of draft domestic legislation aimed at implementing EU 
secondary legislation, the primary competence lies normally within the powerful standing 
committees. The committees on EU policies are entitled to receive all relevant documents; 
they can call in ministers to discuss a Commission proposal and they can adopt an opinion 
addressed to the competent standing committee, but they do not have a general function of 
sifting European proposals and reporting to the standing committees. However, if the standing 
committee does not take a position on the proposals assigned to its review, the EU Committee 
can request that its opinion be transmitted to the government. A stronger role is foreseen in 
the review and discussion of the government's report on EU affairs, where the EU 
41 
Committees can present a report to the plenary, after consulting the sector-specific 
committees. When they deal with institutional issues or the politics of the EU, the committees 
are also responsible for reviewing resolutions adopted by the European parliament. Deputies 
may also avail themselves of normal control and information procedures to initiate a debate 
on EC/EU issues. 
On matters related to the implementation of Community rules and to the compliance of 
domestic rules with EU law, the powers of the committees on EU policy are more intense. 
Both committees have the lead role in their respective House's examination of the Annual 
Community Act. This marks a sharp difference with the past: in the Senate, until the 2003 
reform, this role was a prerogative of the power:fu1 Committee for Constitutional Affairs. In 
addition, today's committees must be consulted on all government proposals for the 
implementation of EU secondary legislation as well as on proposals that may raise issues of 
conformity with EU legisl~tion. They can make observations or adopt an opinion on these 
texts, which are then addressed to the relevant standing committee for that subject matter. The 
Rules of Procedure in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate provide that, when the XIV 
Committee issues a negative opinion on draft proposals, the proposal cannot be adopted by 
the standing committee (in a so-called decentralized procedure of adoption), but has to be 
discussed and voted in the plenary. In connection with the recent constitutional reform, which 
assigned a greater role in EU affairs to the Regions, art. 23 of the Senate Rules of Procedure 
demands that the EU Committee examine the compatibility and coordination of any proposed 
measures with regard to regional competencies, as set out in art. I I 7 of the Constitution. The 
committee must also examine the proposed measure's compatibility and coordination with 
regard to the respect of the subsidiarity principle, as set out in art. 120 of the Constitution. The 
Committee on EU policies thus assumes the crucial role of ensuring the smooth coordination 
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of various layers oflegislation and competencies- European, national and regional (Chamber 
RoP, art. 126; Senate, RoP, art. 23.3). Finally, the XIV Committees have the right to appoint a 
rapporteur when standing committees review the "most important" rulings of the European 
Court of Justice. This scrutiny can eventually lead to the adoption of a resolution to the 
govermnent (Chamber, RoP, art. 127-bis; Senate, RoP, art. 144-ter.). 
The XIV Committees are also responsible for interparliamentary relations and, in particular, 
for cooperation with the European parliament and the COSAC. 
Like their predecessors (the Giunta and Commissione speciale), the two committees are 
generally still characterized by a consensual working style, keep conflict low-key, maintain a 
non-partisan attitude, and entertain dialogue with the executive in an informal and cooperative 
atmosphere. 
Control over the government's participation in EU decision-making: fact-finding and 
policy-setting activities 
The Italian parliament has gradually developed a wide range of instruments to acqmre 
information on EU policy developments and to discuss the govermnent' s general orientations 
on EU affairs, as a prerequisite for exercising its role in the scrutiny of EU draft legislation 
and in the subsequent implementation ofEU law. 
Under art. 3 of Law 11/2005, before each European Council, the Italian govermnent has to 
provide both Houses with the agenda of the meeting and inform them of the position it intends 
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to adopt. Also, upon request from the competent standing committees, the relevant minister 
' 
has to brief the committee on the forthcon:Ung meetings of the Council of the Union. The 
I. 
government then has the obligation to report on the results of the meetings of the European 
Council of the Council of the Union within .15 days after the meeting. In. addition, in twice-
yearly reports, the President of the Council of Ministers or the Minister for European Policy 
must keep the Houses abreast of the main issues and the most politically sensitive initiatives 
planned or under discussion at the EU level (Law 11/2005, art 3.5 and 3.6). 
The second major source of information on EU affairs for the parliament is the government's 
Annual Report on the EU. Since 1999 (Law 25/1999), this report has replaced a number of 
written reports that the government was previously required to submit, at different times 
during the year. It is meant to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of play of EU 
affairs, covering both a review of what happened in the previous year and of the government's 
priorities for the next twelve months. According to art. 15 of Law 11/2005, the report should 
cover the following: (a) the state of play ofEU policies, including security and defense policy 
and justice, liberty and security; (b) the main guidelines of the government's position on 
negotiations in future EU legislation; (c) the implementation of cohesion and regional policy 
in Italy, with particular reference to the use of funds allocated to Italy, referring, when 
appropriate, to the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors; (d) the follow up given 
to the resolutions and observations adopted by the Houses and by regional authorities; (e) the 
list of cases in which the government has decided to challenge, before the European Court of 
Justice, a decision adopted by the Council or by the European Commission. 
The report should be presented to both Houses every year before January 31, together with the 
government's draft proposal for the Annual Community Act. The correlation between the 
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presentation of the annual report and the tabling of the Annual Community Act is designed to 
provide more focus and prominence to the parliamentary debate on EU affairs, with the 
establishment of a so-called "Session on Community Affairs". The idea is to concentrate the 
discussion on , a whole range of aspects regarding national participation in EU decision-
making, combining the forward-looking discussion over trends in EU policy-making with the 
approval of domestic implementing legislation. The model chosen was the Budget Session in 
which, in the second semester of each year, the parliament examines the budget and sets 
guidelines for future economic legislation. 
The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies have put in place similar procedures for the joint 
discussion on the Annual Report and on the draft Community Act that require the 
participation of both the Committees on EU affairs and sector-specific standing committees. 
In short, the Committees for European policies examine the Annual Report and present an 
opinion to the plenary, taking into account the comments received from the other standing 
committees. Their opinion, together with the Annual Community Act, is then considered by 
the plenary. MPs may table resolutions on the Annual Report. These are voted upon after the 
final vote on the Annual Community Act (Chamber of Deputies, RoP, art. 126-ter; Senate, 
RoP, arts. 144-bis c.6 and 7). 
Since the year 2000, the Houses also discuss the European Commission's Annual Legislative 
and Work Program (CWLP) as well as the Council's Annual Program. The aim here is to 
enhance the Italian parliament's ability to identify future issues in the EU system. The 
procedure, introduced on a trial basis in March 2000, follows the one proscnbed for the 
Annual Report, involving the standing committees, the Committees for EU policies and the 
plenary, thus ending with a vote on a resolution. The Committees for EU policies review the 
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Program and adopt a report, which is then discussed and adopted by the plenary. While in 
previous years the debate on the CL WP had not had a significant impact {it took place too late 
iri the year, due to late transmission by the government and scheduling problems within the 
Houses), in 2006 both Houses succeeded in examining the Programs in the first months of the 
year. The Senate adopted its resolution on the CL WP and the Annual Program of the Austrian 
and Finnish Presidencies on January 26, 2006. The Resolution on the 2005 CLWP had been 
adopted on November 9, 2005. This allowed the parliament to take part in the pilot project 
"Raising. European awareness" launched by the Conference of Speakers of the EU 
Parliaments, aimed at encouraging national parliaments to hold coinciding debates on the 
CLWP. 
Existing rules prevent representatives of private interests or organizations from appearing 
before the committees on EU matters. Thus, the committees"have turned to a wider use of 
inquiries as a vehicle for access to outside sources of expertise. In this way, they exchange 
views with business and trade unions, NGOs and other organized interests. Usually, inquiries 
are launched without reference to a single proposal for EU legislation. Rather, they deal with 
broad issues, which remain on the EU agenda for a longer period of time or aim at evaluating 
the implementation of existing regulations in order to suggest amendments or new initiatives. 
During the XIV legislature (2001-2006), in the Chamber of Deputies, major inquiries were 
held on the EU decision-making process, on EU initiatives for strengthening competitiveness 
and on 2007-2013 financial perspectives (jointly with the V Committee on Budget, Finances 
and Programming). During the same period, the Senate carried out two inquiries on the 
objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and on the proposal for a directive on services in the internal 
market (jointly with the Committee on Industry, Trade and Tourism). Furthermore, a joint 
Senate/Chamber inquiry was conducted on the Future of the EU. 
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Scrutiny of EU draft legislation 
Since the end of the 1980s, the Italian parliament has gradually developed a "document-
based" system of EU draft legislation scrutiny. However, in practice, the parliament's 
influence on the govermnent has remained limited until now. During the XIII Legislature 
(1996-2001) the Chamber reviewed eleven proposals of EU legislation, amongst which ten 
were scrutinized by the Committee for EU policies. This confinns the crucial role played by 
the XIV Committee and the inertia of vertical committees, overwhelmed by the pressure of 
domestic business (Osservatorio sulla legislazione, 1999). 
Whereas some reasons for this limited input can be found in structural factors (predominant 
focus on legislation rather than on control functions, low importance attached to European 
affairs compared to domestic issues, general pro-European feelings), parliamentary control 
over EU affairs has also suffered from more practical and concrete weaknesses. Four major 
problems have emerged in recent practice: incomplete and late transmission of draft 
legislation by the govermnent; lack of access to technical information clarifying the 
background and impact of EU legislation; bad timing of parliamentary scrutiny; absence of 
feed-back on the follow-up given to parliamentary resolutions. The recently adopted Law 
11/2005 addresses these unresolved issues and could lay the ground for a more effective use 
of scrutiny powers. 
According to art. 3 of Law 1 1/2005, the President of the Council of Ministers or the Minister 
for European Policies is to transmit to the parliament {but also to the Regions) all proposals of 
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EU and EC legislation and their subsequent modifications, together with an indication of their 
likely date of discussion or adoption. This obligation extends to the transmission of 
Commission Green and White Papers, official communications and other consultative 
documents as well, thus adding further elements to the government's existing duty to transmit 
all draft EC legislation as well as proposals for acts to be adopted under the second and third 
pillar (Law 128/1998; Law 209/1998 and Law 422/2000). In addition, the Department for 
European Policies of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (see Chapter 5) is charged 
with keeping the Houses regularly informed of the state of play as regards proposals 
forwarded to them and with informing the Houses - without delay- when these proposals are 
put on the agenda of a meeting of the Council of the Union. 
The Houses' standing committees can then examme those acts and adopt resolutions or 
forward their opinions to the government. The precise mechanisms for the parliamentary 
scrutiny are further spelled out in the two Houses' Rules of Procedure (Chamber of Deputies, 
RoP, art. 125 -127-ter; Senate, RoP, art. 142-144-quater). 
In order to perform their scrutiny, the standing committees can request additional written 
information from government departments on the state of play of Council negotiations on the 
proposal. Furthermore, they can request information on the views and opinions expressed by 
stakeholders, on compliance costs for the administration, and on the estimated impact on the 
domestic legal system, on businesses and on citizens. Indeed, article 13 of Law 12811998 
requests that the govermnent accompany the transmission of EU Acts that have already been 
adopted with a short assessment of the internal regulations that will need to be amended in 
order to implement those Acts. However, such · information is functional to future 
implementation rather than to the scrutiny of EU proposals in the earliest stages of discussion. 
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This provision is meant to facilitate a more substantial scrutiny of EU proposals. As the 
government generally has on hand a wealth of material and information to which the 
parliament does not have access, it makes more sense for the parliament to request: that 
information from the government than to try to replicate it autonomously. Once the 
parliament has pored over all the relative evidence, it can decide whether the government 
position is justified or not. 
Parliamentary scrutiny reserve 
One of the most important innovations brought about by Law 1112005 is the introduction of 
the "parliamentary scrutiny reserve". Previously, the Italian parliament had often voiced its 
dissatisfaction at not being able to keep up with the pace and timing of discussions on 
proposals within the Council of the Union. In some cases, the parliament had voted a 
resolution on a proposed EU measure only to discover that the proposal had been adopted by 
the Council a few days earlier. The introduction of a scrutiny reserve similar to that existing in 
the UK system had come to be seen as the best remedy to such situations. 
The government was reluctant initially, but it finally accepted a "soft version" of the 
principle, as set out in art. 6 of Law 422/2000. When forwarding EU draft legislation to 
parliament, the government had to indicate its expected date of adoption explicitly. If the 
Houses had not expressed their opinion within that deadline or, in case of postponement, 
before the meeting of the Council during which the proposal was to be adopted, the 
government could give its vote on the proposal. 
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If this prov1Slon aimed at ensnring at least some synchrony between the EU legislative 
process and the agenda of parliame11tary committees, the new provisions introduced with Law 
1112005 marked a further step forward. In essence, once the parliament starts considering a 
draft EU legislative act, the government has to wait for it to conclude its scrutiny before 
exercising its own powers within the Council. The only exception is if parliament has not 
issued an opinion within 20 days. This time limit runs from the day the government informs 
the Houses that it has put a parliamentary scrutiny reserve in the Council. The scrutiny reserve 
may be requested by the parliament, but can also be issued by the government on its own 
initiative. For legislative proposals or other measures of particular political, economic or 
social importance, the government may decide to put a parliamentary scrutiny reserve on the 
text under discussion within the Council or on some parts of it and inform the parliament of 
this decision, implicitly inviting it to give its views on the subject matter. If, after the usual 20 
days, parliament has not issued an opinion, the government can proceed to exercise its 
powers. 
This "dual nature" of the parliamentary scrutiny reserve shows how the government's 
approach towards parliamentary control in EU affairs is changing. It shows, in fact, a greater 
understanding of the parliament's needs for time and information as a prerequisite to effective 
scrutiny, as well as a more positive view of parliament's role in domestic decision-making on 
EU affairs. The parliament is no longer seen as an antagonist but as an ally, and its control is 
not an unwelcome interference but a tool to reinforce the quality and effectiveness of the 
Italian position within Council negotiations. Legend has it that Rocco Buttiglione (when 
Minister for EU Policies in the Berlusconi !I government and thus in charge of the Single 
Market Council, as we shall see in Chapter 5) noticed, at a certain point, that the wise use of 
certain forms of parliamentary scrutiny reserve could be very useful for the negotiating 
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delegations and thus started to ... invent itl Europe being a small place, after all, the truth 
would out, hence the need to formally introduce it into parliamentary practice. 
The new system of scrutiny reserve has not'yet been applied. It is clear that the successful use 
of this instrument will depend first of all on the level of "European sensibility" of the MPs or 
on the government's willingness to use this negotiating tool by including the parliament in 
negotiations. Secondly it will depend on the parliament's ability to complete the scrutiny 
quickly. To this end, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure (Senate, 
RoP, art 29, Chamber of Deputies, RoP, art 25.4) state that the likely calendar of adoption at 
EU level of relevant legislative proposals should be taken into account by standing 
committees when preparing their own agendas, but this provision has yet to be implemented 
much in practice. Moreover, the twenty day time limit is quite short; though it may allow 
enough time to hold one meeting on the subject, and perhaps even to call in the relevant 
minister to answer some questions, it may not allow enough time for a more substantial 
scrutiny. 
Finally, two instruments have been introduced to ensure that the government is held 
accountable for the follow-up given to the parliament's resolutions, First, the President of the 
Council or the Minister for EU Policies is to inform the parliament of the outcome of Council 
negotiations within fifteen days from the date of the Council meeting, This statutory provision 
reinforces what is already possible under the parliament's rules of procedure, by which 
standing committees may always call in ministers to provide information on the outcome of 
negotiations or on the follow-up given to parliamentary resolutions. Parliamentary practice, 
however, does not reveal a frequent use of such post-Council sessions. Secondly, in the 
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Annual Report on EU policies, the government has to report on the follow-up given to 
parliamentary resolutions and to observations made by regional authorities. 
Overall, available data highlights a constant increase in the parliament's attention to European 
affairs. Yet, it is interesting to note, a significant part of this increased attention is channeled 
through procedures other than formal scrutiny - most of all through oral hearings. In fact, 
deputies as well as ministers fmd oral evidence procedures speedierthan formal scrutiny and 
more suitable to an informal and cooperative exchange of views. In many cases, therefore, 
hearings on EU proposals have replaced legislative scrutiny. During the XIII legislature, 
different ministers made 32 appearances before the two Houses's standing committees. 
Hearings were also organized with European Commissioners, members of the European · 
parliament, the governor of the Bank of Italy and the director of the special coordination unit 
for the management of structural funds. 
The Italian parliament's role in the implementation of EU legislation 
Until very recently, the discussion and adoption of measures implementing EU legislation 
represented the main access point to the EU policy process for the Italian parliament. The 
focal point for the parliament's involvement in the implementation phase was the Annual 
Community Law, set up in 1989 with the La Pergola Law, subsequently amended several 
times and currently regulated by Law 1112005. The purpose of the Annual Community Law is 
to ensure the regular, systematic and timely transposition of EU legislation into the national 
legal order (see Chapter 5). The discussion and approval of the bill is conducted in parallel 
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with the discussion of the government's Annual Report on EU affairs, thus creating a sort of 
"Community session", during which the parliament focuses exclusively on EU policies. 
By virtue of the mechanisms introduced with the Community Act, the parliament can have a 
complete picture of the measures to be incorporated in the national legal order, and then 
decide on the most appropriate legal tool to use for the implementation of each of them (law, 
delegated legislation, regulation, etc ). The rationale behind the Conu,nunity Act is therefore to 
strike a balance between efficiency and democratic control. On one hand, by combining 
several implementing measures in a single package, the government can speed up adoption 
and reduce the chances of having an individual measure held up by parliament. On the other 
hand, parliament obtains information and oversees a number of measures that would normally 
be adopted by the government or the Regions, without its participation. 
As mentioned in section 3, apart from the Annual Community Act, the Houses are involved in 
the implementation of EU law through other channels. The standing committees can review 
and adopt resolutions on the acts adopted by the EU institutions and on decisions of the ECJ. 
Most importantly, for each legislative proposal discussed by the parliament, the Committees 
on EU policies give an opinion as regards its conformity with EU law. 
Accordingly, several measures have been introduced by parliament to enhance the quality of 
implementing legislation and to ensure greater coherence between domestic and EU 
regulations. For the Chamber of Deputies now, one of the mandatory parameters to be 
considered by standing committees when conducting the pre-legislative evaluation of 
domestic bills is their level of consistency with EC legislation. The opinion of the Committee 
for EU policies on the consistency of internal legislation with EU norms has also been given 
53 
greater weight. In short, this means that the standing committee may overrule a negative 
opinion issued by the committee only after having obtained a vote in their favor from the 
plenary. 
The Chamber has also included the "Community bill" among the instruments to be evaluated 
by the Committee for Legislation, an ad hoc body established in 1998 and composed of ten 
deputies. The Committee for Legislation provides the other standing committees with 
"neutral" advice concerning the quality of legislation, some categories of bills, and schemes 
of governmental regulations: in certain cases, this is obligatory; in others it can be requested 
by a minority of members of the committee. Its opinion may only be overruled by a vote of 
the plenary. 
As regards the simplification of legislation, the most noteworthy innovation is the shift from 
fragmented initiatives to an organic and periodic program within the framework of the annual 
simplification law introduced with Law 50 of March 8, 1999. This system-envisages that each 
year the government present both Houses with a program for the simplification and 
reorganization of existing legislation in a set of areas listed therein. On the basis of guidelines 
set out by parliament, the government adopts -within a fixed timetable- consolidated texts, 
which repeal obsolete provisions, amend and coordinate norms, and systematically identify 
legislative rules, administrative regulations and relevant EU legislation on the same subject. 
Parliamentary committees monitor the enactment of consolidated texts. 
Participation in COSA C's activities and other interparliamentary bodies 
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The Italian parliament takes an active part in COSAC meetings. The Italian delegation is 
composed of representatives from the Bureaus of both Houses' Committees for EU policies. 
Participation in COSAC debates provides Italian deputies with an important opportunity to 
share best practices with their EU counterparts and to acquire first hand information on other 
parliaments' experiences with scrutiny of EU affairs. Tills played an important role, for 
example, in shaping the ideas that drove the recent reforms of parliamentary participation in 
EU decision-making. Indeed, the Italian parliament favored the further development of 
COSAC and supported the proposal to establish a permanent secretariat. The Italian 
parliament also actively participated in the meetings of the EU parliament's Conference of 
Speakers. 
Conclusions 
Any independent observer, looking at the Italian parliament's role in EU affairs, should be 
remarkably impressed by the improvements made in the last ten years or so. In a short time-
span, the Italian parliament has successfully addressed many issues that had remained 
unresolved for years, thus. greatly reducing the gap with those national parliaments that were 
best organized in the scrutiny of EU affairs. While maintaining its traditional model of 
"paper-based scrutiny", the parliament now has in place a full-fledged scrutiny system based 
on the leading role of permanent committees specialized in EU affairs. It has expanded the 
scope of its scrutiny of EU policies, it is regularly informed of developments in EU affairs, it 
has developed clear procedures for scrutiny and fact-finding, it is even protected in its 
prerogatives by the introduction of a scrutiny reserve system. This progress is also matched by 
further developments within the executive: the government has finally created a coordinating 
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body on EU affairs, thereby helping to fill the gap with other member states (see next 
chapter). The degree of Europeanization of the Italian parliament in 2006 is certaillly greater 
than ever before. 
Moreover, recent legislative changes signal a significant evolution in the way relations 
between Europe and the parliament is perceived. In the I 980s, scrutiny of EU legislation was 
considered a matter for the European parliament. The national parliaments were then called to 
play a role in the scrutiny of EU policies to compensate for the democratic deficit at a 
European level - a stopgap move, meant to last only until the European parliament succeeded 
in developing full legislative and control powers. The focus of the Italian parliament's action 
on EU affairs was thus the implementation of EU directives. 
In the wave of reforms that followed the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the parliament's 
role in EU affairs moved away from a position focused on the implementation of EU 
directives, towards a more positive and proactive role in shaping the national position on draft 
EU legislation. This reflects the idea that the EU and the Italian political systems are no 
longer two "separate legal orders"; they are rather two deeply interconnected systems. 
Consequently, the national parliament's participation in EU decision-making is also essential 
to the quality of domestic legislation as the parliament has to factor in EU policy priorities 
when legislating. Conversely, parliamentary input can be instrumental to assessing the likely 
impact of draft EU legislation on the domestic system, thus contributing to the preparation of 
a stronger and better argued national position in negotiations within the Council. Thus, the 
Italian government and parliament become allies - not rivals ~in the formulation of national 
positions on EU policy. 
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, However, by looking only at legislative developments it is easy to exaggerate the impact of 
the various reforms. From interviews with MPs, for example, quite a different picture 
emerges: first, committees' hearings are less frequent than one would expect from an active 
parliament; secondly, the government's coordinating body, CIACE, is still essentially a 
"paper body" with little significance in practice, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Thus, in truth, 
the parliament still has to deal with a fragmented interlocutor. Thirdly, not only has the 
parliamentary scrutiny reserve never been used (at the time of this writing), but there are 
members of the XIV Commissions today that are not even aware of the existence of such a 
negotiating tool(!). 
Hence, though it is indisputable that significant improvements have been made, it also has to 
be said that full advantage has not been taken of their potentiaL Worse yet, the extent of these 
improvements are not clear to many MPs, Thus, it is more prudent at this stage to suspend 
judgment on the real impact of the reforms. It remains to be seen whether they will deliver 
real change or whether, once again, Prince Fabrizio di Salina's famous phrase in Giuseppe 
Tomasi di Lampedusa's The Leopard will hold true for Italy: "Things must change if they are 
to remain the same ... ". 
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